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The recent Regulation (EU) 2019/1381, published on the 6th September 2019, aims to
improve the transparency and sustainability of the EU risk assessment in the food chain
by amending the General Food Law Regulation (EC 178/2002) and a number of other
regulations related to the food sector. This Regulation is introduced as a response to
the Fitness Check of the General Food Law Regulation as well as a response to public
concerns expressed by a European Citizens’ Initiative on glyphosate and pesticides.
This article evaluates the amendments introduced by Regulation 2019/1381with respect
to the institutional and regulatory environment in the food chain and more specifically
concerning the risk assessment procedure. For this purpose, we perform a comparison
of the institutional and organizational characteristics of the European Food Safety
Authority (EFSA) and European Medicines Agency (EMA) in relation to the processes
of risk assessment and risk evaluation, especially the processes surrounding genetically
modified foods and pesticides, and how these characteristics affect the politicization
of these processes. We conclude that the risk assessment process followed by EFSA
would have benefitted and become more effective and less politicized, if the recent
Regulation 2019/1381 had introduced some of EMA’s institutional structures and
methods on risk evaluation.
Keywords: risk, assessment, food, regulatory, governance
INTRODUCTION
In the past, food policy was within the competence of the Member States in the European
Union (EU). Following a series of crises in the late 1990s [the Bovine Spongiform Encephalitis
(BSE) crisis, E. coli etc.], the Member States transferred the food policy competences, particularly
with respect to food safety, to the EU institutions in the early 2000s. This transfer resulted in
institutional and legislative changes and introduced a number of Regulations, Directives and
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decisions. The Prodi Commission (1999–2003) created the
Directorate General SANTE1 and the General Food Law (GFL,
Regulation 178/2002) established the European Food Safety
Authority (EFSA) (Chatzopoulou, 2019b). These developments
reflected the need for an integrated policy at the supranational
level that could lead to harmonization of food and feed safety
rules and marked the Europeanization of food policy across
the EU Member States (Alemanno, 2006; Chatzopoulou, 2015,
2019a). European people received this food policy transition
mostly positively (Eurobarometer2, 2019, p. 28). However, EFSA
has been criticized for lack of effectiveness particularly with
respect to risk analysis, selection of data and information, risk
communication; lack of transparency and broad representation
of the available scientific knowledge (Chatzopoulou, 2015);
and the long duration risk assessment processes3, which also
created delays in the subsequent authorization of applications
(EuropaBio, 2016; Wesseler and Kalaitzandonakes, 2019). These
concerns about transparency resulted in some degree of public
dissatisfaction and contestation of EFSA’s work. Moreover,
concerns about conflict of interest among EFSA’s experts led
the European Parliament to withhold EFSA’s budget resulting in
stricter administrative rules (Chatzopoulou, 2015).
Following the adoption of the European Citizens’ Initiative
(ECI) Regulation in 20104, but before it entered into force,
Greenpeace claimed to have collected 1 million signatures calling
for a moratorium on genetically modified (GM) crops. During
2014–2018, the Commission launched the Fitness Check of
the GFL Regulation, which also identified various concerns
regarding the risk assessment of GM organisms (GMOs) and
the governance of EFSA. In addition, following a series of
critiques by various non-governmental organizations, an ECI,
that had collected 1,070,865 signatories5, to “Ban Glyphosate and
Protect People and the Environment from Toxic Pesticides”6 was
presented to the Commission on the 23rd of October 2017. This
initiative raised concerns on the transparency and sustainability
of EFSA’s risk assessment processes in the food chain. A public
hearing was organized at the Parliament on 20 November
20177. Responding to these concerns, the European Commission
(EC) submitted on 11 April 2018 a regulation proposal to
the Council and the European Parliament (EP) that led to
Regulation 2019/1381. This Regulation introduced amendments
in Regulation (EC 178/2002) on general food law and a number
of Regulations related to GM food and feed (1829/2003) and
1Initially known as SANCO.
2https://www.efsa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/corporate_publications/
files/Eurobarometer2019_Food-safety-in-the-EU_Full-report.pdf, Special
Eurobarometer Wave EB91.3.
3https://chemicalwatch.com/15504/efsa-delays-bpa-exposure-assessment
https://www.icis.com/explore/resources/news/2008/12/10/9178492/basf-slams-
efsa-delay-on-amflora-safety-decision/.
4http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/149/european-citizens-
initiative.
5http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/successful.
6http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/2017/EN/C-2017-8414-F1-EN-
ANNEX-1-PART-1.PDF. The initiative was registered 25/01/2017 and was
answered 12/12/2017.
7http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/2017/EN/C-2017-8414-F1-EN-
MAIN-PART-1.PDF.
feed additives (1831/2003) along with eight legislative acts dealing
with specific sectors8 in the food chain9. Thus, the paper focuses
mainly on the regulated products GM and pesticides and not
on non-regulated ones (e.g., contaminants). The amendments
aim to improve the transparency, reliability and independence
of studies submitted to EFSA in order to support EFSA’s risk
assessment process.
The Regulation emphasizes the proactive and automatic
communication to the public, at an early stage of the risk
assessment, of all studies submitted to EFSA for risk assessments
via EFSA’s website thereby strengthening the transparency and
underpinning EFSA’s assessments while protecting legitimate
confidential business information10. Moreover, the Regulation
introduces a greater involvement of the Member States in the
Management Board in line with the inter-institutional “Common
Approach on EU decentralized agencies11,” as it is in the case
of the European Medicines Agency (EMA). For instance, the
Member States are encouraged to be active in the nomination
of scientific panel experts for risk assessment. Such a change is
expected to broaden the number and type of experts with respect
to disciplines and geographical distribution.
Taking stock on the existing literature on risk governance, this
paper addresses the overall question: to what extent will the recent
Regulation, on the transparency and sustainability of the EU risk
assessment in the food chain, improve the risk assessment process
in EFSA and increase trust among the European people?
To address this question, this paper links the amendments
made by the Regulation, in the governance of risk analysis for
EFSA, to the corresponding ones in EMA. This comparison
is relevant in understanding the governance of risk assessment
because EFSA and EMA belong to the same cluster of agencies,
both are under DG SANTE and their areas of expertize
are connected, both agencies consider aspects of health and
environment and perform risk assessment for products that
will be introduced to the market12. The foundation of both
agencies, aimed to ensure that risk assessment processes, are
based on objective scientific knowledge. However, the governance
of risk assessment of food and feed biotechnology in EFSA has
been highly contested, in comparison to medical biotechnology
in EMA. This contestation is also accompanied by a low
acceptance of food and feed biotechnology. For example, the
acceptance of genetic modification by society differs among the
two sectors, e.g., food and agriculture and health and medicine
(Olynk Widmar et al., 2017).
The paper is structured as follows: After presenting the
competences and governance structures of EFSA and EMA, the
8These are GMOs, smoke flavorings, food contact materials, food additives, food
enzymes and flavorings, plant protection products and novel foods.
9http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-environment-public-
health-and-food-safety/file-transparency-and-sustainability-of-the-eu-risk-
assessment-in-the-food-chain.
10http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-2942_en.htm.
11https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/gfl_transparency_comm_proposal_
synopsis_20180410_en.pdf.
12We did not compare EFSA to EEA or ECDC, for example, because these two
agencies do not perform risk assessment of products for the market. We did not
chose EEA and ECHA because they do not directly provide scientific opinions to
DG SANTE as both EFSA and EMA do.
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following section discusses the real problem that raises criticisms,
over time, in relation to the governance of risk assessment in
EFSA. A description of the policy process is also presented,
followed by the discussion of the results.
THE MAIN CRITICAL ISSUE:
BACKDROPS OF RISK MANAGEMENT
PROCESS
The founding of EFSA and EMA aimed to support the
Commission’s work by providing scientific based opinions based
on risk assessment and risk evaluation processes respectively.
However, EFSA’s risk assessment opinions on food and feed
biotechnology have been criticized, especially with respect to
transparency (publication of studies used for the assessment13)
and demonstrated politicization elements (Löfstedt, 2004;
Chatzopoulou, 2015). EMA, on the other side, does not face such
critiques concerning biomedicine and genetic medicine. This
article suggests that this difference is related to the dissimilar
governance of risk assessment in these two agencies, implicating
directly the risk management processes. One contrasting
difference is the role of the member states in the risk assessment
process. The member states’ involvement matters as it shapes, as
it would be expected, the governments’ attitudes and possibly also
the public opinion. Regulatory systems and ad hoc decisions are
not only a response to public attitudes but they also contribute to
forming public attitudes in a significant way (Qaim, 2016, p. 117).
Olynk Widmar et al. (2017) demonstrate that GM acceptance
in the society differs among sectors, e.g., it depends on if GM
food and feed are used and associated with human health or
with plant biotechnology. These studies show that GMOs used
in pharmaceutical production do not face the same contestation
as GMOs used directly for food or food processing (Qaim, 2016).
For example, a series of scientific controversies among member
states created delays during the risk management processes in
the case of maize14 (Qaim, 2016; Eriksson and Chatzopoulou,
2017). Following the risk assessment process by EFSA, the
disagreements emerge in the comitology that consists of civil
servants from all Member States and oversees the Commission’s
use of delegated powers. When qualified majority voting (QMV)
cannot be reached in this committee, then the Appeal Committee
can overrule the Commission by QMV. Most often, the Appeal
Committee ends up with no decisions and then the Commission
has the final responsibility15 (Christiansen, 2019, p. 111). In the
great majority of cases, this results in (1) a favorable scientific
opinion by EFSA, (2) no opinion through comitology, or (3)
threats of court cases of inaction (ibid). In the case of medicines
registration by EMA, there is no comitology procedure. Formally,
the Commission’s decision is based on EFSA’s risk assessment
opinion. And although the Commission has authorized GMO
13https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2019/04/17/Europe-s-new-rules-for-
food-safety-approval-Building-trust-in-science.
14http://www.arc2020.eu/pioneers-gm-maize-1507-a-case-history/.
15Please see Eriksson et al. (2019) and Lehrman (2014) for a detailed presentation
of the authorization process in the comitology procedure.
applications in the past years for food and feed use, these
decisions were not for cultivation. If the decision would have
only been based on EFSA’s risk assessment, several additional GM
products for food and feed, or also for cultivation might have
been approved by the EC. Consequently, it can be argued that
in practice there is still a moratorium on the approval of GMOs
for cultivation, as the only GM crop that has been authorized
for cultivation in recent years (the Amflora potato) had its
authorization annulled in 2013. The EU Court argued that there
was a procedural error in the approval process (General Court of
the European Union, 2013) due to insufficient involvement of the
Member States in the standing committee by the Commission.
In other words, the final rejection of the Amflora potato was
based on national politics and interests and not on EFSA’s science
based risk assessment. Although the EU introduced an opt-
out mechanism (Directive EU 2015/412) in 2015 which allowed
member states to restrict or prohibit cultivation of authorized
GM crops in their territory, this did not resolve these issues
(Eriksson et al., 2019).
Such incidents reflect a broader uncertainty with respect
to the risk management at the Commission level (following
EFSA’s risk assessment), which the existing decision-making and
governance processes have not been able to address adequately.
These incidents also demonstrate the importance of the national
views and interests in the decision-making, which seem not
to be based on EFSA’s scientific risk assessment on safety
for health and the environment (Qaim, 2016, p. 116). Thus,
politicization is leading to outcomes that are not based on
scientific knowledge, affecting the legitimacy and reputation of
the governance of risk assessment processes and the role of EU
institutions, namely EFSA.
In light of these arguments, this paper analyses to what
extent the current development with the Regulation 2019/1381
will be able to address effectively issues on the governance
of EU risk management. For this purpose, we compare the
institutional and organizational characteristics of EFSA and EMA
with respect to the risk assessment process, which constitutes the
basis of risk management by the Commission. This comparison
is expected to allow us to unfold and understand the necessary
changes in the EU institutional and regulatory environment
with respect to risk assessment and the risk management
procedure on food biotechnology. Such changes can potentially
contribute to elimination of delays and promote innovation in
food biotechnology in a responsible manner.
THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES AND
RISK ASSESSMENT IN EFSA AND EMA
Despite their similarities, the two agencies, EFSA and EMA,
follow different governance structures, which affect their
functioning, reputation, and legitimacy. Governance provisions
and structures determine the control mechanisms used by the
agencies’ principals (the Commission and the Member States).
EFSA is the most recently founded of the two agencies, and
as above mentioned, it was established in 2002. Furthermore,
while the risk evaluation of medicines has been harmonized
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BOX 1 | The three interconnected components of risk analysis according to
the EU General Food Law, Regulation 178/2002 (L31/7, L31/8).
9. “Risk” means a function of the probability of an adverse health effect
and the severity of that effect, consequential to a hazard;
10. “Risk analysis” means a process consisting of three interconnected
components: risk assessment, risk management and risk
communication;
11. “Risk assessment” means a scientifically based process consisting of
four steps: hazard identification, hazard characterization, exposure
assessment and risk characterization;
The risk assessment must be undertaken in an independent, objective
and transparent manner based on the best available science.
12. “Risk management” means the process, distinct from risk
assessment, of weighing policy alternatives in consultation with
interested parties, considering risk assessment and other legitimate
factors, and, if need be, selecting appropriate prevention and control
options; (Regulation 178/2002:7.
13. “Risk communication” means the interactive exchange of information
and opinions throughout the risk analysis process as regards hazards
and risks, risk-related factors and risk perceptions, among risk
assessors, risk managers, consumers, feed and food businesses, the
academic community and other interested parties, including the
explanation of risk assessment findings and the basis of risk
management decisions;’ (Regulation 178/2002:8).
more at the global level, in the case of certain food aspects,
such as GMOs, there is significant divergence concerning risk
assessment processes (e.g., process versus product based)16.
EFSA’s establishment aimed to provide independent scientific
advice and clear communication on existing and emerging risks
in the area of food and feed safety, animal health and welfare as
well as plant health (European Food Safety Authority, 2014).
The GFL (Regulation 178/2002)17 defined the rules for the
entry of new food and/or feed products into the EU market,
established EFSA, and set out certain procedures related to food
safety. The GFL provides four measures: (1) the establishment
of the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF), (2)
the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed
(PAFF), (3) the adoption of emergency measures, and (4)
the establishment of a general plan for crisis management.
In addition, it includes three inter-related components of
risk analysis: risk assessment, risk management and risk
communication (Box 1).
The GFL also defined the principles of EFSA governance.
Taking into account the opinion of the EP, the Commission
proposes EFSA’s 14-member Management Board. The selection
is based on the members’ experience and expertize and not on
nationality (European Food Safety Authority, 2011), but it should
secure the broadest possible geographic distribution within the
Union (Reg. 178/2002, Art. 25). This process constituted an
innovation in the EU agencies’ governance, since until then
territorial representation in the agencies Management Board
was important. Additionally, four of the Management Board
members should represent organizations such as consumers
16Point suggested by one of the reviewers.
17https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:
32002R0178&from=EN.
and other interests in the food chain (European Food Safety
Authority, 2011).
The Management Board appoints an Executive Director who
is responsible for the implementation of the financial rules
of the Authority and has to ensure the adequate organization
of the legality of transactions (European Court of Auditors,
2011). The Executive Director also has the responsibility for
the day-to-day management of EFSA and is supported by the
Heads of department, Heads of unit, the Chief Scientist and the
Senior Policy Adviser18. A Scientific Committee and 10 Scientific
Panels (corresponding to different policy areas19) and their
working groups supports EFSA’s risk assessment work. According
to the existing legislation, the Scientific Committee20 and the
scientific panels provide the Authority’s scientific opinions to
the Commission, each within their own spheres of competence
(Commission Regulation (EU), 2017). The Scientific Committee
consists of the chairs of the Scientific Panels complemented by
six independent scientific experts who do not belong to any of the
Scientific Panels and focuses on the coordination and consistency
of the scientific opinion procedure (Reg. 178/2002). The scientific
panels are composed of independent scientific experts who
carry out scientific assessments, organize public hearings where
necessary, and develop related assessment methodologies. These
are appointed for 3-year periods, similar to the ones in EMA.
However, they do not secure the geographic representation of all
member states as it occurs in EMA’s scientific committees.
When EFSA receives a market application first validates its
completeness or if it needs more information to proceed. Then
EFSA’s relevant Panel establishes a working group that develops a
draft and submits it to the Panel for discussion and often to public
consultations. For example, for the GMO Panel, there are three
permanent working groups: molecular data, food and feed, and
environmental risks). The working group consists of members
of the relevant Panel and a number of additional scientists
from specialist fields. This working group assesses the available
scientific information from the Member States, research institutes
or companies. EFSA may request more data directly from the
applicant. An important aspect is the defining of a timetable of
the process from the beginning, which depends on each case.
The adoption of the assessment, usually a scientific opinion (it
can also be a Statement, Guidance Document or another type of
output), is based on majority in the relevant Panel at a plenary
meeting21.
Based on EFSA’s risk assessment, the Standing Committee
on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed (PAFF)22 under the
Commission decides the final authorization of the product.
18http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/people/operationalmanagement.
19Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (AHAW), Panel on Biological Hazards
(BIOHAZ), Panel on Food Contact Materials, Enzymes and Processing Aids
(CEP), Panel on Contaminants in the Food Chain (CONTAM), Panel on Food
Additives and Flavorings (FAF, Panel on Additives and Products or Substances
used in Animal Feed (FEEDAP), Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms
(GMO), Panel on Nutrition, Novel Foods and Food Allergens (NDA), Panel on
Plant Health (PLH) and PPR.
20The latest mandate for the Scientific Committee and the ten panels began on 1
July 2018.
21http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/howwework/workingpractices.
22https://ec.europa.eu/food/committees/paff_en.
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The PAFF is an intergovernmental committee composed of
representatives of all Member States and is chaired by a European
Commission representative that also exemplifies the networked
characterization of the EU agencification23. Its mandate covers
the entire food supply chain – from animal health issues on
the farm to the product on the consumer’s table. The PAFF
plays a key role ensuring that the EU measures on food and
feed safety, animal health and welfare, and plant health are
practical and effective. The PAFF delivers opinions on draft
measures that the Commission, who is responsible for the risk
management, intends to adopt. This is the first committee where
all the member states are represented in the risk analysis process.
But, this Committee constitutes part of the risk management not
the risk assessment (scientific level) and constitutes a significant
difference when compared to EMA.
Similarly to EFSA, EMA consists of scientific committees,
seven of them, and a number of working parties and
related groups, which conduct the scientific work. The EU
pharmaceutical legislation was introduced in 1965 as a reaction
to the thalidomide scandal (malformation effects on babies
by the medicine for pregnant women). EMA was founded
in 1993 by merging the pre-existing Committee for Human
Medicinal Products (CHMP) former CPMP (Committee for
Proprietary Medicinal Products) and the Committee for
Veterinary Medicinal Products (CVMP). This merger initially
created the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal
Products (EMEA) that was renamed as European Medicines
Agency (EMA) in 200424. EMA’s was expected to further the
efficient and flexible implementation of EU legislation on
pharmaceuticals, and ensure rapid access of new products to the
Community market (Sauer, 1996, p. 23, as cited Groenleer, 2009,
p. 145). In order for a medicinal product to be placed on the
EU market, it has to follow the core pharmaceutical regulation,
namely the marketing authorization requirement. There are three
different procedures for authorizing medicines: the centralized
procedure, the mutual recognition/decentralized procedure and
the national procedure (Wirtz, 2017). For certain biotechnology-
derived and high tech products the centralized procedure is
mandatory. While the marketing authorization is granted by the
EU Commission, the scientific assessment of the application is
carried out by the EMA.
Each of the EMA committees follows its own rules of
procedure. Each committee appoints a rapporteur who prepares
an assessment report, which the committee will consider
and eventually adopt as part of a scientific opinion or
recommendation. For certain procedures, a “co-rapporteur” also
prepares an assessment independently from the rapporteur25. The
work of the rapporteur and co-rapporteur is supported with
23For a detailed description of the process (see Lehrman et al., 2014, p. 69–
70), https://www.slu.se/globalassets/ew/org/centrb/mbiot/publikationer/
shapingourfood_mistrabiotech_web_140625.pdf.
24REGULATION (EC) No 726/2004 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND
OF THE COUNCIL of 31 March 2004 laying down Community procedures for the
authorization and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use
and establishing a European Medicines Agency (Text with EEA relevance) (OJ L
136, 30.4.2004, p. 1).
25https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/committees/how-committees-work.
resources and expertize by an assessment team with necessary
expertize and resources. In addition, the EMA secretariat
provides technical, scientific and administrative support for each
assessment. In order to mobilize the best expertize for medicines
evaluation, regardless of where experts are geographically based,
rapporteurs and co-rapporteurs can establish multinational
assessment teams by including experts from other Member States
as well as their own. The EMA committees try to reach their
conclusions by consensus whenever possible, but if not the
committee holds a vote, which follows specific procedures and
rules26. For this purpose, Member States have to liaise with the
Management Board and the EC in order to ensure that the
final composition of the Committees covers the scientific areas
relevant to its tasks. The committee considers the final assessment
report and eventually adopts it as part of a scientific opinion
or recommendation.
Since 2004, CHMP carries out the assessment and evaluation.
This Committee often consults the Pharmacovigilance Risk
Assessment Committee (PRAC) in relation to risk assessment.
Directive 2001/83/EC and Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 lay
down specific rules concerning the pharmacovigilance of
medicinal products for human use and set up the PRAC.
Accordingly, the PRAC is responsible for the risk management of
the use of medicinal products for human use including detection,
assessment, minimization and communication related to the risk
of adverse reactions, design and evaluation of post-authorization
safety studies and pharmacovigilance audit.
Both the CHMO and PRAC committees consist of a Chair
and one member and one alternate member appointed by each
of the EU Member States and one member and one alternate
member appointed by each of the EEA-EFTA States. The EC
also appoints several representatives. Two experts (one member
and an alternate) on clinical pharmacology and pharmaco-
epidemiology to ensure that the relevant expertize is available
within PRAC, other two (one member and one alternate), to
represent healthcare professionals; and finally two more (one
member and one alternate) to represent patient organizations.
All members, except those appointed by EU and EEA-EFTA
states, are appointed based on a public call for expressions of
interest and after consulting the EP based on their relevant
expertize in pharmacovigilance matters and risk assessment
of medicinal products for human use. The members and the
alternates of the Committees are appointed for a term of 3 years,
which may be prolonged once. The aim is to guarantee the
highest levels of specialist qualifications and a broad spectrum
of relevant expertize. Since all Member States are involved in
the risk evaluation as part of the scientific committees for
pharmaceuticals, scientific differences in national opinions are
resolved before the EMA provides its scientific opinion to the
Commission, who then mostly rubberstamps EMA’s opinions.
When concerns over the safety or benefit-risk balance of a
medicine or class of medicines are raised, a referral procedure,
which can be started by the EC, a Member State or the
company that markets the medicine, is used to resolve such
26https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/committees/how-committees-work;
https://www.ema.europa.eu/documents/other/prac-rules-procedure_en.pdf.
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issues. In a referral, the medicine, or class of medicines, is
“referred” to EMA so that it can conduct a scientific assessment
on behalf of the EU and then make a recommendation for
harmonized position across the EU. There are a number of
reasons why a referral may be started, ranging from concerns
over the safety to disagreements among Member States on the
use of the medicine. Safety-related referrals are assessed by
the PRAC and then either by the CHMP or, for nationally
authorized medicines, by the Coordination Group for Mutual
Recognition and Decentralized Procedures-Human (CMDh). All
other referrals on human medicines are assessed by the CHMP
only. For most referrals, the EC issues a decision to all Member
States reflecting the measures to take to implement the Agency’s
recommendation27.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Figure 1 presents a chronological record of events since the
GFL founding in 2002 until the submission of the legislative
proposal by the Commission to the EP and the Council in
April 2018. In December 2010, Greenpeace and Avaaz submitted
a pilot ECI with one million signatures in accordance with
the rules established by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. This first
pilot ECI responded to the first authorization in 12 years by
the Commission in March 2010, for the cultivation of a GM
crop in Europe28. The 2010 ECI called for a moratorium on all
new authorizations and a review of the GM approval process,
claiming that the existing authorization raised serious health and
environmental concerns. As the ECI process was not formally
implemented at this point, the EU institutions did not have
to take action. Years later, in March 2015, in disagreement
with EFSA’s scientific opinion, the International Association
for Research Cancer (WHO, IARC) “classified glyphosate as
‘probably carcinogenic to humans’ (Group 2A),” which triggered
a lot of concern about the objectivity of science in the society.
Between 23/10/2017 until 17/01/2018, a most recent ECI “Ban
glyphosate and protect people and the environment from toxic
pesticides” was launched, which indicated concerns on the
transparency in the risk management process by EFSA. This
recent ECI became one of the four successful ECIs since the
Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 Article 11(4) of the Treaty of
the European Union was put into practice in 201229 and the
Commission responded according to the Lisbon Treaty rules.
Furthermore, during 2014–2018, the Commission launched
a Fitness Check in order to address if the existing GFL is
still “fit for purpose” regarding its relevance and effectiveness,
efficiency, coherence, and whether it should be simplified so
that it can become less costly. The Fitness Check recognized
the positive outcomes of the EU food and feed safety policy,
but it also acknowledged that there is space for improvement
in “the implementation of the functional separation of the risk
assessment and risk management at EU level, set out in the GFL
27https://www.ema.europa.eu/human-regulatory/post-authorisation/referral-
procedures.
28http://www.greenpeace.org/eu-unit/en/News/2010/first-citizens-initiative/.
29http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-2563_en.htm.
Regulation”30. In addition, the Commission received feedback
20/12/2017-17/01/2018 and started an Open Consultation
23/1/2018-20/3/2018. Moreover, this was discussed at various
fora with different actors, namely the Advisory Group on the
Food Chain and Animal and Plant Health31; the EFSA Advisory
Forum (national food safety authorities on 6th February 2018);
the Commission Expert Group on General Food Law32 (5th
March, 2018) and finally the Scientific Committee of EFSA33 (14
and 15/02/2018). This demonstrates a long process that involved
a variety of public and private actors, before the Commission
formulated its legislative proposal on 11/04/2018.
CHANGES INTRODUCED BY THE
RECENT COMMISSION REGULATION
2019/1381 ON THE TRANSPARENCY
AND SUSTAINABILITY OF THE EU RISK
ASSESSMENT IN THE FOOD CHAIN
On 11 April 2018, the Commission submitted a proposal
to the Council and the Parliament for a regulation on the
transparency and sustainability of the EU risk assessment in the
food chain. This proposal regulation aimed to amend the GFL
Regulation (EC 178/2002) and a number of other regulations
related to, amongst others, GM crop cultivation, food and feed
uses (1829/2003), and food and feed additives (1831/2003). The
recent Reg. 2019/1381 addresses aspects of governance and by
introducing a change in the composition of the Management
Board, in a way, recognizing the importance of the representation
of all member states, as it is the case in EMA:
“It is thus appropriate to include representatives of all Member
States of the European Parliament and of the Commission as well
as of civil society and industry organizations in the Management
Board, while providing that those representatives should have
experience and expertize not only in the fields of food chain
law and policy, including risk assessment, but also in the fields
of managerial, administrative, financial and legal matters and
ensuring that they act independently in the public interest” (Reg.
2019/1381, Art.14, L231/3).
30https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/gfl_fitc_executive_summary_2018_
en.pdf.
31The Advisory Group on Animal and Plant Health discussed the Commission’s
proposal on transparency and sustainability of the EU food and feed safety risk
assessment model on 5 February 2018.
32REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL on the transparency and sustainability of the EU risk assessment
in the food chain amending Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 (on general food
law), Directive 2001/18/EC (on the deliberate release into the environment of
GMOs), Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (on GM food and feed), Regulation
(EC) No 1831/2003 (on feed additives), Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 (on
smoke flavorings), Regulation (EC) No 1935/2004 (on food contact materials),
Regulation (EC) No 1331/2008 (on the common authorization procedure for food
additives, food enzymes and food flavorings), Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 ([on
plant protection products) and Regulation (EU) No 2015/2283 (on novel foods)
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2018/EN/COM-2018-179-F1-
EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF.
33Fifteen trade and business associations, four Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs), one Member State (MS), and one citizen submitted feedback. 471 people
participated in the OPC, 318 citizens and 153 stakeholders.
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FIGURE 1 | Timeline of events in relation to the Commission’s legislative proposal for GFL until the EC submitted its proposal to EP and Counsil.
Responding to the shortcomings in the Authority’s high level
expertize identified by the Fitness Check (Art. 16, L231/3),
the new Regulation emphasizes the importance of greater
involvement of the Member States in the Management Board
by nominating scientific panel experts for risk assessment.
This change would be more in line with the inter-institutional
Common Approach on Union Decentralized Agencies in the
effort to increase the consistency of the EU agencies’ management
board model. Such a change is expected to broaden the number
and type of experts with respect to disciplines, number, and
geographical distribution. In order to do so, it is suggested
to provide better financial compensation, which is currently
considered low, in order to attract highly qualified experts.
However, expansion of the Management Board (Reg. 2019/1381)
and the number of candidates does not adequately address the
problems in the actual structure of the risk assessment process,
which is directly linked to the expertize of the Authority’s
scientific panels. Neither, “a more active role to ensure that
a sufficient pool of experts is available to meet the needs
of the Union risk assessment system” of the Management
Board or the member states in the appointment of the
scientific panels’ members would be sufficient (Reg. 2019/1381).
This change does not describe precisely what is an “active
role” and how this could ensure “high level of scientific
expertize, independence and multidisciplinary expertize.” While
the national scientific organizations are involved “in drafting
preparatory scientific opinions to be peer-reviewed and adopted”
(Art. 18) by the scientific panels they are not represented in the
preparation phase (ibid).
Regulation 2019/1381 focuses significantly on risk
communication through: (1) Automatic publication of all
studies and supporting information submitted to EFSA for
risk assessment, in an electronic format that would be publicly
available and easily accessible; (2) Stakeholders would be
consulted on submitted studies, and confidentiality would be
protected in justified circumstances; (3) A specific procedure
would be implemented for renewals of substances already
authorized; and (4) The Commission would, via delegated
act, adopt a general plan for risk communications in the
agrifood chain (Comitology Newsletter #52, 2018). While this
is important, it raises concerns in the industry concerning
confidentiality and property rights with implications on
research and innovation in the sector34. Most importantly,
these changes do not tackle the identified concerns on the
risk assessment process adequately as they concentrate on the
risk communication.
When the EP received the proposal from the Commission,
the Special Committee on the EU authorization procedure for
pesticides (PEST) was established and held 12 meetings during
2018. In the EP the Environment, Public Health and Food
Safety Committee (ENVI) has been assigned the responsibility
to write the report. The first Rapporteur was Renate Sommer
(EPP, DE), who suggested in its draft report that the EP would
prefer to align the EFSA rules with those of other EU agencies
(e.g., the EMA) as much as possible, but ensure that confidential
information does not become available at the time the application
is submitted but when EFSA adopts its final opinion35. Early
publication of information could jeopardize innovation and jobs
creation as the industry would be reluctant to invest in EU
countries. Renate Sommer resigned36 in protest at the final
shape of her report, when the plenary voted by 427 in favor
(172 against, 67 abstentions) of amendments37 to the draft
EFSA reform on 11 December 2018. Mrs Sommer characterized
the decision a “populist” move that will harm innovation and
“endanger the whole food chain.” The Spanish MEP Pilar Ayuso
González took over the representation in trilogues, despite her
vote against the final EP report. The Council reached an internal
position in December.
During the process, there were many disagreements in the
Council. For example, the Dutch government criticized several
elements, in particular the notion of granting EFSA more
funds to fulfill the required extra tasks. Figure 2 presents a
34https://www.bechbruun.com/en/news/2019/new-eu-food-regulation-may-
influence-the-disclosing-of-legitimate-business-information.
35https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0417-AM-132-
140_EN.pdf?redirect.
36https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/new-food-
transparency-rules-risk-falling-victim-to-eu-institution-spat/ and https:
//www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/meps-ready-to-negotiate-
efsas-transparency-rule-but-need-to-find-a-new-negotiator/.
37The EP suggested 112 amendments (see amendments at http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0417_EN.html?redirect).
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FIGURE 2 | Procedure on Commission’s legislative proposal after it was submitted to EP and Council.
recount of events since the submission of the Commission’s
proposal to the Council and the EP38 until the adoption of
a new regulation on the transparency and sustainability of
the EU risk assessment in the food chain by the Council on
13 June 2019. The Parliament finalized its position by a vote
and agreement in the Plenary (11/12/2018) followed by the
adoption by the Council (12/12/2018). A provisional agreement
was reached at the third trilogue meeting (11/02/2019), and was
endorsed in the ENVI committee (20/02/2019). “The provisional
agreement sets out that: supporting data and information linked
to an application for authorization will be made public by the
EFSA after the assessment of the validity of the application unless
the applicant proves that this could significantly harm its interest
and requests confidential treatment by EFSA. The applicant will
be able to file a confirmatory request if s/he disagrees with EFSA’s
assessment of confidentiality. In this case, the information cannot
be made public until a final word is said. The Commission
will be able to request EFSA to commission its own verification
studies in exceptional controversial cases of high importance
for the society and member states will have a more active role
in helping EFSA attract more and the best scientists to participate
in Scientific Panels. Risk communication among all actors – the
Commission, EFSA, member states and public stakeholders –
will be improved to ensure a more coherent, transparent and
continuous flow of information throughout the risk assessment
process39.” The Parliament approved the agreement (17/04/2019)
and the Council has formally adopted a new Regulation40 on
the transparency and sustainability of the EU risk assessment
in the food chain on June 13, 2019 based on the Commission’s
proposal41.
The new Regulation amends the GFL Regulation and eight
legislative acts dealing with specific sectors of the food chain:
GMOs (cultivation and for Food/Feed uses), feed additives,
smoke flavorings, food contact materials, food additives, food
enzymes and flavorings, plant protection products and novel
38http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/630315/EPRS_
BRI(2018)630315_EN.pdf.
39https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/02/12/safe-
and-transparent-food-chain-provisional-agreement-on-availability-and-
independence-of-scientific-studies/.
40https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/gfl_transparency_comm_proposal_
20180410_factsheet_en.pdf.
41http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-19-1031_en.htm.
foods42. Following its entry into force 20 days after publication,
September 6, 2019, it will become applicable 18 months later
thus by the end of March 2021. The Regulation introduced
one important change with respect to the role of the Member
States in the governance of EFSA. When the Regulation will
apply, each Member State will nominate a representative to
the Management Board, increasing their role and level of
responsibility in supporting EFSA and ensuring an increased
scientific cooperation. The selection of the Member States’
representatives in the new Management Board will be based on
specific requirements such as relevant experience and expertize
in the field of the food chain legislation and policy, including risk
assessment. The strict criteria of independence will also have to
be fulfilled (ibid).
DISCUSSION
The EU divides the feed and food risk analysis in risk
assessment, risk management, and risk communication, where
EFSA is responsible for risk assessment, the Commission for risk
management and they share risk communication depending if
it is an assessment or management issue. This division was a
response to the mismanagement of the BSE crisis and the high
degree of politicization on food policy, which is today reflected
in the rationale behind the governance of EFSA where both the
Commission and the Member States instated a “police patrol”
type of control. However, this division of competences did not
decrease the politicization; at the contrary, it complicated the
process by distinguishing the two different levels, one scientific
(EFSA) and one political (EC). The scientific committees of
EFSA have been criticized for not representing broadly the
available scientific knowledge. The agency’s work depends on its
capacity to combine expertize from the Member States. National
scientific organizations contribute to EFSA’s work through their
participation as experts to EFSA’s scientific panels, and by
providing EFSA with scientific data and studies.
However, the representation of all Member States in the
scientific panels is not required. This was not changed by the
recent amendments by Regulation 2019/1381. As a result, only
a small number of Member States (six) provide more than two
42https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-19-1031_en.htm.
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thirds of the experts on EFSA’s ten scientific panels that can
have maximum 21 members43. In the last round that started
in June 1st, 2018 6 member states (France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom) provide 109 out of the
168 experts in the 10 scientific panels of EFSA. Some countries
have no representative at any panel, and there are increasing
difficulties in attracting enough new candidates to work in them.
Here the first difference from EMA that has more financial
and human resources and all Member States are represented
in the scientific committees. Consequently, the risk assessment
process in EFSA by the independent scientists of the scientific
committees does not involve all Member States. In praxis, the
Member states’ different views and interests are expressed and
negotiated during the voting in the Standing Committee on
the Food Chain and Animal Health under the EC. As a result,
although the scientific opinion provided by EFSA constitutes
the point of departure for the decisions on the authorization of
food and feed, these decisions are strongly affected by national
politics and views. When it comes to a highly contentious field
such as GMOs and their derived products, the PAFF almost
never reach a common decision. There are always a number
of EU member states that vote against authorization, despite
a favorable scientific recommendation by EFSA (Smart et al.,
2015). Looking at the composition specifically of the EFSA GMO
panel over the years since its inception, it is obvious that there
is a lack of representation from several countries. The panel has
had 16–21 experts appointed for 3-year periods. In total, over
the periods since 2003 and until the most recent (2018–2021),
there has been an accumulated 117 appointments and 72% of
these come from only eight countries (Figure 3). When this is
compared to the voting behavior of these countries in 2003–
2015, five of them (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain,
and United Kingdom) are characterized by a strong inclination
to vote in favor of authorization and thus following EFSA’s
scientific recommendation. Two of them (France and Italy) have
a tendency to abstain from voting and occasionally vote either
for or against authorization. Several countries that tend to always
vote against authorization of GMOs have never been represented
in the EFSA GMO panel, such as Croatia, Cyprus, Lithuania
and Luxembourg, or represented very few times, such as Austria,
Hungary and Poland.
It may be argued that EU Member countries without
representation can still be active during the decision making
process by submitting their comments and then getting a point-
by-point reply afterward in annex to EFSA’s opinion. However,
the possibility of giving comments does not really compensate for
their lack of representation. In fact, this has only created delays,
instead of contributing to effectiveness, as countries lacking
representation tend to present their own scientific evidence at late
stages making the process to start again. In contrast, differences
in national opinions regarding the approval of pharmaceutical
products are resolved before the EMA provides its scientific
opinion to the EC given that all Member States are involved in
the risk evaluation as part of EMA’s scientific committees.
43https://www.efsa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/event/mb180321/mb180321-i1.
pdf.
Any differences in national scientific opinions regarding the
approval of pharmaceutical products are resolved before the
EMA provides its scientific opinion to the EC given that all
Member States are represented in the risk evaluation as part
of EMA’s scientific committees. Consequently, it is not the
long-term credible commitment for common regulation based
on scientific evidence, instead, the Member States’ short-term
interests and politics, which ultimately determine the food
regulatory framework. Here the second and biggest dissimilarity.
We want to emphasize though that it is important that
EFSA remains politically independent and autonomous. Our
recommendations do not suggest that EFSA should become
politicized. Nor do we suggest that EFSA’s scientists should act
on behalf of their governments, but rather that representation
in EFSA increases the chance that member state being properly
and scientifically informed. If an expert from a particular country
is member of an EFSA panel, then we believe that the chances
increase that the scientific conclusions reach that country’s
decision makers in a more direct manner (e.g., through personal
communications with that expert) and that this will influence the
voting behavior in the PAFF, similar to what happens at EMA. At
EFSA, the lack of representation is creating a politicized situation
in comitology. With the appropriate representation from all
Member States all scientific differences in national opinions
would be resolved before EFSA provides its scientific opinion to
the Commission, who will then basically approve EFSA’s opinion
as it happens with EMA’s opinions.
Moreover, “the regulation of foodstuff mainly has to rely on
post-marketing control” because the foodstuff market is much
more fragmented with the exception of food additives, as well
as novel foods and food ingredients, especially products derived
from GMOs, which need to be authorized before they get access
to the Single Market44 (Krapohl, 2004). In contrast, the specific
rules for the relatively homogeneous pharmaceuticals products
that are produced by large companies allow the premarket45
evaluation and regulation46 (Krapohl, 2004), which is another
difference in the rules governing the two agencies.
High autonomy and low political influence is what should
characterize a regulatory agency. This is relevant for initiatives
and collaborations with other regulatory authorities or the
industry because the higher the autonomy and the lower the
role of politics the more attractive the agency is to collaborate
with. However, as explained, the current absence of a long-term
credible commitment for common regulation based on scientific
evidence is making EFSA a vulnerable target to political interests.
If the wish is to have an independent agency able to provide
advice based on sound science, several changes have to be made
in the organization of the agency.
In the effort to improve citizens and stakeholders confidence
in transparency and sustainability of the EU risk assessment, the
Commission introduced changes in the legal framework on GFL
44Sebastian Krapohl, “Credible Commitment in Non-Independent Regulatory
Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of the European Agencies for Pharmaceuticals
and Foodstuffs,” (2004) ELJ 5 518, 519.
45A post-market control also applies for pharmaceuticals (Pharmacovigiliance),
but this works just as a subsequent fire-alarm control.
46Krapohl, supra note 42, 519.
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FIGURE 3 | Composition of the EFSA-GMO panels by the EU member states from 2003 to 2021.
BOX 2 | The four main elements of the New Regulation agreement aim at:
• Ensuring more transparency: Citizens will have automatic access to
all studies and information submitted by industry during the risk
assessment process. Stakeholders and the general public will also be
consulted on submitted studies. At the same time, the agreement will
guarantee confidentiality, in duly justified circumstances, by setting out
the type of information that may be considered significantly harmful for
commercial interests and therefore cannot be disclosed.
• Increasing the independence of studies: The European Food
Safety Authority will be notified of all commissioned studies to
guarantee that companies applying for authorizations submit all
relevant information and do not hold back unfavourable studies. The
Authority will also provide general advice to applicants, in particular
SMEs, prior to the submission of the dossier. Commission may ask the
Authority to commission additional studies for verification purposes
and may perform fact-finding missions to verify the compliance of
laboratories/studies with standards.
• Strengthening the governance and the scientific
cooperation: Member States, civil society and European Parliament
will be involved in the governance of the Authority by being duly
represented in its Management Board. Member States will foster the
Authority’s scientific capacity and engage the best independent
experts into its work.
• Developing comprehensive risk communication: A general plan
for risk communication will be adopted and will ensure a coherent risk
communication strategy throughout the risk analysis process,
combined with open dialogue amongst all interested parties.
Source: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1030_en.htm
and recently adopted a new regulation based on Art. 43, 114,
and 168 (4) (b) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European
Union. The new regulation emphasizes the need for transparency
and sustainability of the EU risk assessment in the food chain.
The regulation aims to harmonize the procedures followed in
the functioning of EFSA with these followed by other scientific
agencies such as European Chemical Agency (ECHA) and EMA,
since the governance of EFSA is not in line with the Common
Approach on decentralized agencies, such as the composition of
the Management Board. The specific changes in the functioning
of EFSA introduced by the new regulation are going in the right
direction (Box 2) (points 1, 2, and 4). They can contribute to
a more open and qualified communication on risks, which can
decrease fear by providing clear information about real versus
perceived risks. However, there is space for improvement.
Point 1 on ensuring more transparency: The access of the
public to information related to the risk assessment at early
stage while ensuring duly justified confidentiality is significant
and also relevant to Point 2 on increasing the independence of
studies. However, this change combined with the proposed pre-
submission procedure, which can be useful especially for small
and medium size companies, would require more financial and
human resources by EFSA. Another challenge concerns the way
it will be justified what requires confidentiality and what not so
that it will not threaten innovation and business property.
Point 3 indicates that the new Regulation introduces changes
in the governance of EFSA by increasing the involvement
of the Member States in the Management Board, and in
the nomination of members of the scientific panels, §14 and
§15. However, this change focuses on the Management Board
that is involved in the administration of finances but not
directly in the risk assessment. Besides, this change might
increase the number of available qualified risk assessors but
it does not address the representation of the member states
scientific divergences at an early stage. Consequently, this
change does not allow deliberation on scientific divergences
among the member states at an early stage, on scientific basis,
as it happens in EMA during the risk evaluation. One of
the great challenges is how to ensure scientific clarity. This
can only happen by having an extended pool of independent
scientific evidence and strong collaboration among most, if
not all, Member States and the EFSA, which is relevant to
Point 2. The need for available tools to support cooperation
among between EFSA and the Member States is emphasized
by a significant number of respondents47 (40% of citizens
and stakeholders).
Point 4 concerns changes in governance. The main changes
linked to the risk assessment process are introduced in
Art. 25, Art. 28 (5) and Art.32. Nevertheless, these changes
can improve the communication with the public about the
relevant scientific evidence used in the risk assessment process,
scientific evidence still has important role to play for dispelling
widespread misconceptions, so the communication should be
science-based and more in a form of public debates as previously
47https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=21019&langId.
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suggested (Qaim, 2016, p. 115). Therefore, there is a need
for improvement and simplification of the communication
with the public. Better and simpler information by legitimate
actors based on scientific facts and democratic principles can
shape public opinion positively, beyond biased information
and prejudices. It is important for the public to understand
how technology can contribute to food safety, food security,
and sustainable agriculture development, hence it needs to
be utilized and expanded. Biased information and prejudices
distorts public opinion.
Unfortunately, the changes introduced by the Regulation
do not generate any significant changes with respect to the
risk assessment process and the representation of scientists
from all the member states, which is crucial for creating trust
in public opinion among the member states people. Instead,
the amendments mostly focus on increasing and improving
communication and openness of the process. Consequently,
it is not clear if the new Regulation is able to overcome
the existing backdrops, as the governance processes and
organization differences are which determine the Commission’s
final authorization decision.
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